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Abstract.  Information security has adapted to the modern 
collaborative organisational nature, and abandoned “command-and-
control” approaches of the past.  But when it comes to managing 
employee’s information security behaviour, many organisations still 
use policies proscribing behaviour and sanctioning non-compliance.  
Whilst many organisations are aware that this “comply or die” 
approach does not work for modern enterprises where employees 
collaborate, share, and show initiative, they do not have an alternative 
approach to fostering secure behaviour.  We present an interview 
analysis of 126 employees’ reasons for not complying with 
organisational policies, identifying the perceived conflict of security 
with productive activities as the key driver for non-compliance and 
confirm the results using a survey of 1256 employees.  We conclude 
that effective problem detection and security measure adaptation needs 
to be de-centralised - employees are the principal agents who must 
decide how to implement security in specific contexts. But this requires 
a higher level of security awareness and skills than most employees 
currently have.  Any campaign aimed at security behaviour needs to 
transform employee’s perception of their role in security, transforming 
them to security-aware principal agents. 
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1 The need for Information Security 
Organisations today face an ever-increasing number of information security threats: 
intellectual property theft can severely impact competitiveness, loss of customer 
information can damage corporate profiles and loss of access to corporate systems can 
impact the organisation’s productivity [1].  Despite the significant amount of time 
being invested in producing effective security solutions by researchers and industry 
experts, the challenges and potential threats organisations face today are higher than 
ever [1].  
 After implementing technical controls strong enough to minimise an organisation’s 
exposure to all but the most sophisticated (and costly) attacks, security researchers 
and practitioners today focus on humans as the “weakest link” in the security chain 
[2].  Information security turned to the disciplines of Human-Computer Interaction 
(HCI) and Behavioural Economics for security solutions that their employees can, and 
will, comply with [3-5].  Research in usable security and economics of security has 
yielded some valuable insights, but the problem of non-compliance is still rife.  There 
have been steps to re-designing security solutions to fit human capabilities and 
limitations [5-7], and to base on them on people’s real security needs, rather than 
what experts think [8], but we are still lacking an understanding of drivers of security 
behaviour ‘beyond the interface’.   
In this paper, we examine real-world non-compliance examples to understand 
drivers for non-compliant actions in information security. We present a study 
designed to identify the drivers of deliberate non-compliance, and then consider how 
this understanding can be used to transform Information Security Management. We 
begin by summarising existing literature on managing security behaviour.   
2 Organisational approaches to Information Security 
Information Security management currently attempts to reduce an organisation’s 
exposure to security risks primarily by formulating policies of how they should 
behave to avoid those risks, and communicating those policies to employees.  Policies 
are usually in the form of documents, which define the security objectives of the 
organisation, the responsibilities of employees, and sanctions for non-compliance.  
Policies are vital for organisations - without them, specific security implementations 
can be developed without a clear understanding of the organisation’s wider security 
objectives and employee responsibilities [9][10].  But current security policies do not 
address the security challenges organisations face for two reasons: 
1. Employees have no insights on policy design [11]:  policies are designed to reflect 
the way the policymakers believe employees should behave, usually adding 
elements required to comply with regulations, audit checks and international 
standards.   
2. The formulation of both policies and standards is largely based on lessons learnt 
from past failures, and is rarely grounded in scientific principles [12]. Security is 
currently a craft, that is only useful for securing organisations against breaches that 
closely resemble past events. It also makes assumptions about the context and the 
environment in which the interaction of employees with information-handling 
systems takes place, ignoring factors like employee workload, and treating all 
compliance scenarios as the same [13].  This results in policies ending up as long 
lists of dos and don’ts located on web pages most employees only access when 
they have to complete their mandatory annual “security training” and which has 
little to no effect on their security behaviour. 
So employees don’t comply with security policies.  Most organisations respond by 
trying to reduce the possibility for non-compliance through technical mechanisms – 
 such as making downloading of information impossible.  Enforcement usually takes 
the form of access control, restricting which employees can have access to which 
files.  Compliance with the policies may be monitored. (In the case of access control, 
though, what tends to be monitored is whether access entitlements are still appropriate 
– rather than if an employee is in possession of a document they should not have).  
Security training and risk communication are used to influence employee behaviour 
towards compliance and reduce security risks.  There are indications, though, that this 
set of current measures is not effective: 
1. Compliant behaviours are being associated with specific threat scenarios or 
working practises, but there is little understanding of principles, or culture of 
secure behaviour.  This means most employees are unable to take the initiative and 
make local decisions when new security problems arise [14][15]. 
2. Enforced compliance with cumbersome mechanisms consumes valuable employee 
resources, reducing the organisation’s productivity [3][4].  In reality, large parts of 
the organisation (consider line managers, for instance) are complicit in employees’ 
non-compliance, because – whatever the policies say – they value productivity 
more.  
3. Compliance enforcement creates tension and deepens the value gap between 
security enforcers and the rest of the organisation [16].  Frustration with security is 
attributed back to the enforcers, which can result to any information coming from 
them being treated with scepticism or ignored and breeds a negative attitude 
towards information security in general [5] which can discourage compliance with 
security mechanisms - even sensible and well-designed ones [17]. 
Recent industry reports state that information security risks are increasing [1][18-
20], so  Information security research needs to develop more effective and sustainable 
approaches to managing non-compliant employee behaviour. Our contribution, 
presented in this paper, is a detailed, empirically-based understanding of reasons for 
non-compliance.  This provides decision makers with a framework for identifying 
plausible ways of managing employee behaviour more effectively, and evaluating 
their effectiveness in a systematic fashion. 
3 Understanding non-compliance  
To obtain more detailed insights into employee compliance, researchers need access 
to employees who are willing and able to honestly speak about their security 
behaviour within the work environment.  We have built relationships with a number 
of partner organisations that were prepared to grant us access to their employees, 
encourage participation, and publicly assure them there would be no reprisals.  Over 
the past two years we have conducted studies in two partner organisations as part of a 
process to identify areas of friction between the business and security processes, and 
to design and deploy appropriate interventions. 
The first stage in this process is to conduct a series of interviews. This stage has 
been completed in two organisations. 126 interviews were conducted with the US and 
the UK parts of a major energy company, and 86 interviews with the UK employees 
 of a telecommunications company. The interviews were semi-structured and probed 
aspects of security awareness and compliance, including: 
1. The employee’s awareness of the sensitivity of information they handle, and why 
they need to protect it. 
2. Their knowledge of existing security policies, and what mechanisms they should 
or could use to reduce security risks. 
3. Their experiences when interacting with the existing security policies and 
mechanisms.  
4. Examples of, and reasons for non-compliance: how they circumvent policies and 
mechanisms, and their understanding of risks associated with these. 
The majority of employees reported non-compliance in the organisation’s day-to-day 
operations; interviewers then asked follow up questions to identify the conditions that 
led to the use of workarounds, the factors they used to decide whether to comply or 
not comply, and their understanding of the risks involved in their actions.  
The insights we present here are based on a subset of the 126 interviews conducted 
in the first company, and a complete analysis of all interviews with respect to one 
mechanism: access control [21].  These were analysed using a thematic coding 
analysis based on the three Grounded Theory stages [22]: open, axial and selective 
coding.  This led to the identification of three different non-compliance situations: 
high compliance cost, lack of understanding, unavailable compliance mechanisms. 
The second stage of the process, completed in the utility company and underway in 
the telecommunications company, is the deployment of a scenario-based survey that 
presents participants with an example of a conflict situation drawn from an analysis of 
the interviews. Participants are offered 4 non-compliant courses of action that would 
allow them to resolve the conflict and were asked to rank the options in order of how 
likely they would be to use them and also to rate how severe a breach of policy the 
course of action is. A statistical analysis of the 1256 results from the survey (utilising 
MANOVA, Spearman’s Rho and Chi-Squared tests) revealed several key “hotspots” 
where options rated as insecure were still being highly ranked as viable options 
Additionally, we were able to identify a US/UK cultural difference through the 
analysis of the results, which allowed us to further refine our understanding of the 
problem, and potential effective solutions.  We also analysed 874 voluntary free-text 
comments left by participants using a Grounded Theory coding approach. 
Using findings from these studies, summarised in the following sections and 
grouped according to the non-compliance situation they relate to, we aim to devise 
tangible suggestions to reduce the friction between the existing security 
implementation and business processes, provide guidelines for the design and 
deployment of future security mechanisms, and also aid in the development and 
maintenance of a more mature and resilient security culture.   
3.1 Could comply, but cost too high  
The first reason we identified as a driver for non-compliance is the high individual 
resource investment (such as time, or cognitive or physical effort) that certain security 
 mechanisms demand.  The main focus of the majority of employees is not to be 
secure, but to efficiently complete a primary production task – such as manufacturing 
goods, financial investment, or delivering CNI services. This results in employees 
being willing to spend a limited amount of both time and effort on secondary tasks, 
such as security (the Compliance Budget, [3]). Security mechanisms that impose high 
workload overheads make non-compliance an attractive option for quick primary task 
completion [3][23].  Most organisations are unaware of, or ignore, the impact of 
security mechanisms on users. Cormac Herley [4] has pointed out, that in the 
consumer context, “security people value customers’ time at zero”. Our studies show 
that in the work context, organisations work on the assumption that employees can 
simply absorb the effort associated with security compliance.  But because most 
security mechanisms are difficult and cumbersome to use, employees literally feel 
their time/effort being drained.  This experience drives non-compliance: the perceived 
risk mitigation achieved by complying does not seem worth the perceived cost of 
effort and disruption to the primary task [4].  The greater the perceived urgency and 
importance of the primary task, the more attractive or acceptable non-compliant 
options become - even when employees are aware of potential risk.  Employees re-
organise their primary tasks to avoid or minimise their exposure to security 
mechanisms that slow them down significantly [24].  Our interviews yielded several 
examples of this around file sharing [21].  In our subsequent survey, we included a 
file sharing scenario, in which a group of employees had to share a large volume of 
files, but incorrect permissions prevented some of them from accessing those.  The 
pressure of an upcoming deadline, combined with employees knowing that setting up 
access takes about a week, led to the most frequently chosen response (selected by 
32.6% of employees) being “to email the restricted document archive directly to all 
recipients on his work group mailing list”.  The same respondents rated this as the 
second most risky option, giving it a severity rating of 4/5).  In the (voluntary) free-
text comments for this scenario, most respondents described the consequences of not 
completing the primary task as definite and severe, whereas the risk associated with 
breaching the security policy was only a potential one.   
In our interview analysis, we identified the following frequent non-compliance 
instances driven by the primary-task focus:  
1. 50% of employees shared their passwords for quick access to systems if  
colleagues needed access for work purposes, but did not have the necessary 
permissions, because it “would take ages” to get the permissions changed. 
Password and account sharing is a common workaround. Our interviewees also 
expected their colleagues to do the same for them.  Even some managers reported 
this as common and acceptable practice: “employees newly-involved in a project 
access the system using someone else’s credentials until their access is sorted out”. 
This is an example of organisations becoming complicit in circumvention of 
policies and mechanisms which do not fit with the primary task. 
2. 53% of employees reported having used personal unencrypted USB drives to share 
data perceived to be sensitive with colleagues because it is faster and easier than 
company-issued encrypted ones.  The effort involved in using the latter did was 
perceived to be “not worth it for simple file transfers around the office”.  Some 
 interviewees said “they immediately wiped the drives afterwards” to prevent data 
falling to the wrong hands. 
In both cases, the delay to completing the primary task is perceived as “not worth the 
effort” of guarding against a potential, unclear risk; implicit in these statements is 
“we’ve done it many times and nothing bad happened, so surely it cannot be that 
bad?”  Employees knew they were not complying with policies but felt this was 
justified by getting their job done or helping a colleague.  The survey also supports 
our conclusions: in the scenario where an employee does not have an encrypted USB 
stick, the use of an unencrypted one was second most popular choice, scoring less 
than 1% behind the most popular option of borrowing an encrypted drive from a 
colleague.  It was also rated as the second least severe risk; only uploading the files to 
public data storage received a higher severity rating.   
3.2 Could comply, but why should I? 
Inaccurate perceptions of risk and technology underlie many insecure behaviours 
[25][26]. In particular employees under-estimate the risk mitigation that can be 
achieved by compliance with some policies – and this, in turn, makes non-compliance 
appear a more attractive option.  Examples of this include:  
1. Employees rarely considered the possibility that their actions might lead to 
malware being introduced to their organisation’s systems – hence the perception 
that using a personal USB stick would cause no harm.   
2. Employees did not consider that deleted data can be easily recovered from drives 
if those are lost; they believed that deleting all the data from a drive after 
finishing with a file transfer provides adequate protection. 
3. Employees considered any data stored on their company laptops to be secure 
because a Windows password was required to access them - but the Windows 
password was only used for access control purposes. This resulted in unsafe 
practices, like storing sensitive files locally on the laptops, assuming they are 
adequately protected when travelling on public transport [27]. 
We also found most employees did not have a good understanding of what 
information security is, and what it tries to protect.  Security risks were described as 
“just to confidentiality not security” when confidentiality is a key goal of information 
security.  There were also varying and inaccurate statements of what particular 
security policies permitted or prohibited - creating many security myths. 
The survey results indicate that even when employees are aware of a policy and 
interpret it correctly, this is not a strong motivator for individual behaviour. We linked 
each of the options in the scenarios to a behaviour and attitude type.  When asked 
what to do when observing a clear breach of policy by a colleague or visitor, the most 
frequently chosen option was “report suspicions but take no direct action” 
Employees took a passive approach – they did not think they had any responsibility  
to promote compliance with security policies.  It is not sufficient for organisations to 
just correct employee misconceptions about policies and risks of their actions.  They 
should also make adherence to security policies, and actively promoting adherence, 
 part of the psychological contract they have with employees [28] – but this will not 
work if security interferes with individual and organisational tasks and processes to 
the point that compliance is perceived as “not worth it”. 
3.3 Something’s awry, just can’t comply  
In some cases, compliance may not even be an option, regardless of how much time 
or effort employees are willing to invest. Employees reported being unable to comply 
because the implementation the corresponding security mechanisms did not match 
basic requirements: 
1. Employees justified copying files to laptops because there was insufficient space 
on their network drive, or because they had experienced problems accessing files 
they needed from home or while travelling.   
2. Employees found the encrypted USB drives provided by the organisation were too 
small, so alternative file-sharing methods such as using unencrypted drives or 
emailing files had to be used. 
3. The large number of passwords required in order to ensure access to the various 
corporate systems resulted in employees being unable to recall those from memory.  
This led to writing their passwords down, either in electronic form on their laptop 
or in a document they carry with them all the time. 
In the above cases, most employees were aware of the increased risks associated with 
their behaviour, but felt that the organisation’s failure to provide a “properly working 
technical implementation” forced them into workarounds so they could keep working 
and complete their primary task.  The employees’ perception was that the organisation 
would prefer security transgressions to “letting everything grind to halt” – and this 
was confirmed by similar responses from respondents with managerial responsibility 
in the survey.  This is another example of how the organisation is complicit in 
employees’ non-compliance.   
4 Rethinking Information Security Management  
Organisations looking to have effective information security need balance between 
the productivity and risk management goals.  Our observations suggest that currently, 
organisations do not manage this balancing act: they set high targets for both 
productivity and security, and leave it to employees to resolve any conflicts between 
them.  Most of the time, employees will chose productivity because 1) their behaviour 
is focussed on the primary task, and 2) they are principal agents who are trying to 
maximise their own benefit [29].  Based on our results here and those of other studies 
[5, 24] we suggest that most organisations are complicit in security non-compliance.  
They enable and reinforce their employees’ non-compliance choices because they 
1. Reward employees for productivity not security, 
2. Fail to identify and fix security policies and mechanisms that create friction, and 
 3. Rarely enact the sanctions they threaten in case of non-compliance - very few 
organisations that threaten ‘comply or die’ on paper act on it1.  
Pallas [29] has applied the economic concept of Principal-Agent relationship to 
managing information security; we found his approach extremely helpful both in 
explaining the behaviours we identified, and to identify changes that organisations 
can make to break the non-compliance cycle. Employees are rational actors and to 
motivate them to comply with security policies, they have to perceive compliance as 
serving their own best interest [4].  The traditional   “command and control” approach 
– where policies are set centrally by security experts, who select mechanisms and 
specify behaviours that must be complied with, without considering individual tasks 
or business processes – does not work in modern, flat, geographically distributed 
organisations who want to be agile, and want productive employees with ideas and 
initiative.  Most organisations and policy makers have moved from compliance to 
risk-based information security standards (such as ISO27001), but have failed to 
make the same shift when it comes to managing employees’ security behaviour; in 
that case organisations are 'unwittingly complicit' as they do not realise they are 
acting in a schizophrenic and uncoordinated way, negatively influencing employee 
compliance.  Central policies and mechanisms cannot fit the variety of local and 
situational contexts in which individual employee decisions take place.  Greater 
flexibility is needed to adapt to local circumstances, and solve conflict with tasks and 
business processes as they arise. Employees need to understand the risks surrounding 
their roles and the benefits of compliance to both themselves and the organisation, 
and then be trusted to make their own risk decisions in a way that mitigates 
organisational risks [15].  To aid the effective implementation of this security 
management approach the implemented security mechanisms need to be better 
aligned with the primary task, aiming to improve the identified employee 
misconceptions and misunderstandings that lead to non-compliance.  
4.1 Align security policies with main productivity objectives 
As we previously mentioned, security implementations need to act as enablers to the 
primary tasks not blocking those.  Teo and King [30] introduce the term Information 
Systems Alignment to describe “The degree to which the information systems plan 
reflects the business plan”.  We argue that the same needs to apply to information 
security: The more a security policy and its implementation accommodate employee 
priorities and values, the more it improves the alignment of incentives in the enforcer-
employee principal-agent relationship [29].  Thus, the security policy is less likely to 
be resisted [31]. 
                                                 
1
 One of the authors has been involved in a (as yet unpublished) study of a company 
that publicly declares that non-compliance with any of its ‘principal security rules’ is 
grounds for instant dismissal. It would have to dismiss half of its workforce every 
month if it acted on this declaration; it would not be able to continue operating if it 
did. 
 To achieve this Information Security Alignment, employee attitudes and beliefs 
need to be considered when formulating security policies [30].  As shown in Section 
3.2 high-level, abstract information security goals are not a strong motivator for 
employees – they cannot compete with concrete demands of business processes that 
employees know well, and for which they understand the consequences of failure to 
deliver.   
Failure to take into account the beliefs and attitudes of employees results in the 
target group (end users) not adequately participating in the design of security 
mechanisms, or the creation and maintenance of a strong security culture, which 
inevitably are going to affect their day-to-day jobs.  Participatory design [33] has been 
at the core of most successful human factors and usability engineering processes, and 
security designers cannot afford to ignore it.  The reasons for non-compliance 
identified in our findings provide a good starting point for incorporating similar 
procedures into security design. Those need to be communicated to policymakers and 
security designers, so that information security solutions more suited to employee 
daily routines can be created.  This can re-adjust employees’ cost-benefit decisions, 
increasing compliance rates and creating a positive attitude towards security, which 
can also render employees more susceptible to attempts to instigate and maintain a 
stronger security culture within the organisation. 
4.2 Adjusting the cost-benefit perception 
To improve employee compliance decisions we also need to target their individual 
cost-benefit analysis.  After creating policies and security implementations that 
accommodate for employee needs and priorities, we need to target the cost-benefit 
balance to shift it towards compliance by making it an economically attractive option 
for employees [34].  Beautement et al. [3] identify four factors through which this 
balance can be influenced (Design, Culture, Monitoring, Sanctions).  In the remainder 
of this section we discuss how these four factors relate to our current findings, 
explaining how each one of those can be targeted to encourage compliance by 
changing the employees’ perceived cost-benefit balance. 
Design.  Even for the most risk-aware and knowledgeable employees, the cost-benefit 
balance will favour non-compliance when implemented systems impose high 
overheads on their primary tasks [24].  Reduced compliance costs can eliminate the 
identified “cost too high” and “can’t comply” non-compliance instances.  To improve 
on the security design an organisation needs to:  
1. Check that security mechanisms work in a given context.  A network drive on 
which employees are encouraged to store their documents should be adequately 
sized so that they do not run out of space, combined with auto-archiving systems to 
prevent employees travelling around with confidential data on their laptops.  In 
addition, encrypted laptop drives could reduce the risks when employees need to 
have some files stored locally and VPN access should be improved to reduce the 
need to transfer data through other channels.  Single sign-on systems can eliminate 
 the need to write down passwords, while providing every employee with an 
encrypted USB drive can reduce the need to use unencrypted ones. In all cases the 
secure option should also be the easiest one to use. 
2. Provide flexibility to make local and situational adjustments.  Employees who need 
access to systems to proceed with their primary tasks cannot wait for a few 
working days for that to be granted, otherwise they will find another way to get 
access (usually through their trusted colleagues).  Many interviewees reported that 
outsourcing of IT services had removed previously available routes to getting local 
and temporary adjustments made. The ability to make such adjustments would 
reduce password sharing and information sharing through unauthorised channels 
that is driven by the focus on productivity. The processes required for security, as 
well as the necessary mechanisms and technology, should mesh cleanly with the 
needs of the primary task. 
Communicating the value of security. Once compliance-enabling systems are 
implemented, the organisation can consider raising employee awareness of risks and 
principles for managing them.  Blanket ‘security education campaigns’ are not 
effective – messages need to be targeted at the perceptions held by specific groups of 
employees. The question “why should I care?” needs to be answered – what are the 
benefits?  Organisations have to move away from the ‘fear’ sell of breaches and 
sanctions, and emphasise information security’s contribution to achieving 
organisational objectives, and personal values, such as professionalism, instead [35].  
This can be achieved through improved understanding of: 
 Everyone contributes to security.  Employee perception of security needs to be 
changed from “getting in the way of achieving organisational goals” to “important 
for the organisation achieving its goals” [36].  Employees need to realise that by 
following recommended security practices they are contributing to the smooth and 
efficient operation of business processes, as security ensures the availability of the 
resources required for the primary task to be successfully completed.   
 My specific contribution to protecting the organisation.  All employees can 
damage the organisation when not complying, even in relatively small ways. Thus, 
they all bear some responsibility for organisational security.  Employees need to 
know what precautions they should be taking to reduce the organisation’s exposure 
to security risks. 
The two points above need to be communicated to employees through well-designed 
Security Awareness, Education and Training (SAET) campaigns.  Those need to be 
formulated on a role-specific basis based on the identified employee misconceptions 
and non-compliance drivers, rather than flooding them with generic, organisation-
wide advice that ends up doing more harm than the attacks they seek to prevent [37].  
This approach also allows for increased flexibility, as organisations whose employees 
are adequately aware about the need for security, can tailor their behavioural change 
campaigns to start from the education stage.  When employees are adequately 
knowledgeable on threats and vulnerabilities surrounding their role, organisations 
only need to implement an effective training scheme, testing their knowledge and 
 only reverting back to education when misunderstanding is identified.  Once the 3 
steps have been effectively implemented, role-specific reminders of the key messages 
are needed to reinforce awareness and keep the employees informed on new risks.  
Also, education material should always be available for employees that need to refer 
back to it.   
 
Monitoring, sanctions – maybe. Trust, definitely.  When the security systems of an 
organisation are designed in a way that favours compliance and employees are well-
aware of the information security risks related to their roles, expensive architectural 
means (physical and technical mechanisms to prevent unwanted behaviours [29]) 
become obsolete: compliance now comes from employees motivated to behave 
securely [38], based on norms developed by the existence of both formal and informal 
rules that are significantly cheaper to enforce [29].  This can also create a positive 
environment where employees feel well-trusted by the organisation, inducing further 
compliance.  The definition of trust as “willingness to be vulnerable based on positive 
expectations about the actions of others” [39] may sound like an oxymoron to old-
school command and control security managers, but organisations where employees 
have increased responsibilities are more likely to establish a high-level of security 
awareness and improved understanding of the need for security [15][28][40].  On the 
other hand, employees that abuse trust should be visibly punished; clever monitoring 
implementations can detect employee trust abuse [41] and employees that observe 
sanctions enforced, are less likely to attempt to knowingly abuse trust.   
5 Conclusions 
Our results show that a better understanding of real-world employee compliance 
decisions creates a new perspective for information security management.  Many 
organisations know that ‘comply or die’ is dead – but some still keep conjuring up its 
ghost, while others struggle to find an alternative paradigm for managing their 
employees’ security behaviour.  We suggest that the first necessary step is to 
recognise employees’ primary task focus, and design security that fits into individual 
tasks and business processes.  Only when this can been achieved should organisations 
focus on communication.  Identifying misconceptions and myths that justify insecure 
behaviour helps to design targeted campaigns to bust or transform these.  A clear set 
of information security principles needs to be identified and communicated to create 
employees who are risk-aware and know how to manage the risks that apply to them.   
5.1 Future research 
We are currently expanding our research to include other organisations, aiming for a 
better multi-organisational understanding of employee security perceptions and 
compliance-affecting factors.  This will allow the generalisation of our research 
findings to provide an industry-wide view of current problematic information security 
 mechanisms and practices, together with suggestions on how those practices can be 
improved to increase compliance rates.  The focusing of our research on the analysis 
of empirical data, gathered by investigating real-world problems from active 
operational environments, can result in improved effectiveness of security decision 
making and wider adoption of the underlying principles by organisations when 
designing their security solutions.  
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